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I. INTRODUCTION
Following someone in public; placing phone calls; and sending love
letters, poems, and gifts are not illegal in South Carolina or in most states.
But when these actions are coupled with a credible threat of violence toward
the recipient, the actor is guilty of stalking.
The phenomenon of stalking has only recently been recognized in the
United States, but the movement to provide protection to the victims has
caught on like wildfire. In 1992 South Carolina joined other states in passing
legislation to tackle this issue. While its legislative initiative is a good first
step, more must follow. This note will provide a cursory view of the
phenomenon of stalking.' It will analyze the substance of South Carolina's
antistalking law,2 and examine the need for this law in light of other laws that
might adequately address stalking. Finally, it will discuss alternatives to the
state's antistalking law and present means by which the law can be strength-
ened to provide relief to victims and stalkers alike.
II. THE PHENOMENON OF STALKING
Stalking is the "willful, malicious, and repeated following and harassing
of another." 3 One commentator described stalking as "a crime which, in the
past, has all too often been dismissed or ignored until ... it's too late, until
someone has been hurt, or even killed." 4 Stalking behavior often accompa-
nies an abnormal fixation towards the victim and includes unsolicited phone
calls, correspondence, gifts, and visits from the stalker; surveillance of the
victim; and vandalism. 5 "Quite often, although not criminal in nature, these
1. See Kathleen G. McAnaney & Laura A. Curliss, Note, From Imprudence to Crime:
Antistalking Laws, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 819 (1993), for an in-depth look at the behav-
ioral aspects of stalking.
2. For a discussion of the technical deficiencies of the law, see Thomas R. Haggard, The
South Carolina Anti-Stalking Statute: A Study in Bad Drafting, S.C. LAW., Mar.- Apr. 1994,
at 13.
3. Robin Westen, Stalkers Must Be Stopped, NEW WOMAN, May 1993, at 122.
4. Nightline:Antistalker Laws (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 3, 1992).
5. See John C. Lane, Threat Management Fills Void in Police Services, THE POLICE
CHIEF, Aug. 1992, at 27 (describing the threat management program instituted by the Los
[Vol. 45:383
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situations create a harassing, even threatening, environment for the targeted
individual. "6
There is no single stalker profile. Stalking's causes are not necessarily
related to poor financial standing or other motives for criminal behavior; not
all stalkers have a previous criminal record and some might even be
considered upstanding citizens.7 However, most stalkers share some common
characteristics, which one authority has labeled "pre-incident indicators" of
stalking.8 These indicators include "references to obsessive love, weapons,
death, suicide, religious themes and a common destiny with the stalked
figure."9 In addition, research on celebrity stalkers reveals that more than
ninety percent suffer from mental disorders." Often their crime is one of
obsession and falls into one of three distinct groups: erotomania," love
obsessional," and simple obsession
3 - the most common group14
The victims of stalking range from high-profile celebrities, 5 politicians,
Angeles Police Department to address the crime of stalking).
6. Id.
7. Outlawing Stalkers, CALGARY HERALD, May 4, 1993, at A4.
8. Gavin de Becker is an authority on protecting celebrities and politicians. De Becker
compiled a database of approximately 9,000 potential and actual stalkers. His pre-incident
indicators were developed from his research of the issue of stalking using behavioral records
and approximately 200,000 letters. Mike Tharp, In the Mind of a Stalker, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Feb. 17, 1992, at 28, 28.
9. Id. at 28-29.
10. Maria Puente, Legislators Tackling the Terror of Stalking, USA Today, July 21,
1992, at 9A.
11. This type of stalker has
the delusional belief that one is passionately loved by another.. .. The delusion is
frequently one of an idealized love, a "perfect match." The person is convinced
that the object, usually of the opposite sex, fervently loves him or her, and would
return the affection if not for some external influence. The onset of symptoms is
sudden; the person often has had only brief or no prior contact with the object.
Michael A. Zona et al., A Comparative Study of Erotomanic and Obsessional Subjects in a
Forensic Sample, AM. ACAD. FORENSIC SCI. J., June 1993, at 894, 894-95.
12. These individuals may or may not have the delusional belief that the victim is also in
love, but do believe that their victims might love them if only given the chance. Consequent-
ly, stalkers in this category begin a campaign to make their existences known to the victims.
Here, the stalkers almost always know the victims through the media only. Id. at 896.
13. Stalkers in this category had some prior connection with the victim, usually as a
customer, acquaintance, neighbor, professional associate, lover, or friend. The stalking
activities begin after the relationship sours or the stalker perceives a mistreatment from the
victim. Here, the stalking campaign is begun either to rectify the relationship or to seek
retribution. Id.
14. Nine and one-half percent of stalkers suffer from erotomania; 43% from love obses-
sion; and 47% from simple obsession. Stalkers and Their Victims, USA TODAY, July 21,
1992, at 9A.
15. David Letterman is stalked by an obsessed fan named Margaret Ray who continues to
3
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and their families 6 to the girl next door.' One source indicates that
seventeen percent of stalking victims are highly recognizable celebrities, thirty-
two percent are lesser known entertainment figures, thirteen percent are former
employers or other professionals associated with the stalker, and thirty-eight
percent are ordinary citizens. 8 One study has reported that approximately
one in twenty adults will be stalked at some time in his or her life.' 9 Another
study reported that 200,000 people in the United States are stalking some-
one.' Finally, while stalking is a crime that can happen to both men and
women, most victims are women.2' Consequently, for the purposes of
discussion this note will assume that the stalker is male and the victim is
female.
Until recently the police have told victims that there was nothing
authorities could do to thwart the undesired attention until their stalkers
harmed them. Then in 1989, nineteen-year-old Robert Bardo gunned down
television actress Rebecca Schaffer as she stood in the door of her home.'
Schaffer's death ended Bardo's two-year fascination with the actress who
starred on "My Sister Sam."' After the Los Angeles Superior Court
sentenced him to life in prison without parole, "[h]is case became a frightening
symbol of a growing phenomenon in the past decade - stalking."2
California was the first state to tackle this issue. In 1990 it enacted the
first antistalking law in response partly to the murders of four other young
women, all of whom died at the hands of their stalkers.Y Since 1990 all fifty
states have enacted legislation; forty-eight statutes directly address stalking.26
break into his house. David Ellis et al., what the New Antistalking Laws Mean, PEOPLE, May
17, 1993, at 72, 72.
16. Kathleen Tobin Krueger, wife of former Texas Senator Bob Krueger, has been stalked
for nine years by an ex-campaign staffer. David Ellis et al., Nowhere to Hide, PEOPLE, May
17, 1993, at 63, 63.
17. Kristin Lardner was a college student murdered by her stalker, an ex-boyfriend.
George Lardner Jr., The Stalking of Kristin: The Law Made It Easy For My Daughter's
Killer, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1992, at C1.
18. Stalkers and Their Victims, supra note 14, at 9A.
19. Tharp, supra note 8, at 28.
20. Ellis, supra note 16, at 63 (referring to a study conducted by Dr. Park Dietz, a
forensic psychiatrist).
21. Nightline, supra note 4.
22. Tharp, supra note 8, at 28.
23. Id. at 30.
24. Id. at 28.
25. The four women each had taken out temporary restraining orders and had communicat-
ed to their families, friends, and police that they thought they were going to be killed. Sonya
Live: Stalker Laws (CNN television broadcast, June 8, 1992) "[I]n each case, police had
indicated, 'Let us know when he attacks you physically, and then we can get involved.'" Id.
26. Anne Seymour of the National Victim Center credits the recent rash of antistalking
laws to the lack of an adequate remedy to stalking:
[Vol. 45:383
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South Carolina jumped on the bandwagon in 1992 when it passed
antistalking legislation,27 modeled after the California law." The signifi-
cance of this momentum is that the nation is seeing for the first time laws
which are preemptive rather than reactionary. Police who have felt their
hands tied behind their backs finally can assist a stalking victim before
violence occurs rather than arresting the stalker only after he has battered or
murdered his victim.
III. A SOUTH CAROLINA CASE IN POINT
A South Carolina case in point is the story of Ann, a graduate of a South
Carolina college who has been stalked by Bob for the past six years.29 Ann's
stalker is a man with whom Ann had one date while both were juniors in
college. Bob repeatedly called Ann, sent her gifts, and followed her to classes
against Ann's request while they were in school. Bob moved out of state upon
graduation; however, since that time he has continuously sent threatening
letters addressed to Ann at her family's home and has made threatening phone
calls to her family members.
In early January 1993, Bob traveled to Ann's hometown trying to locate
her family's residence. Bob called Ann's father from a pay phone to obtain
directions to Ann's house. Bob threatened Ann's father when her father
denied the request. Unbeknownst to Bob, at the time of the call he was less
than three miles from Ann's home. The police arrested Bob for stalking
several days later. Prior to the passage of the antistalking law, the police had
told Ann that there was nothing they could do until Bob harmed her.
The facts of Ann's case will be referred to in the following discussion to
highlight the inadequacies of the remedies available to the victim prior to the
enactment of the state's antistalking law. It is important to keep in mind
throughout this discussion that for a victim, the significance of South
Carolina's antistalking law is that a stalker can be arrested before he inflicts
There are very few laws ... that have been effective in preventing harassment
and repeated acts where there have been credible threats of violence. And I think
one of the reasons the stalker laws have passed with such expediency in many,
many states is that people want to fill the gaps, people like us at the National
Victims Center are tired of hearing from victims, who could do nothing, from law
enforcement, whose hands were tied because they had no legal authority to prevent
such crimes from occurring.
Nightline, supra note 4.
27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
28. Telephone Interview with South Carolina House Representative Irene Rudnick, co-
sponsor of the antistalking bill - H:4086, S.C. General Assembly (1993). Compare South
Carolina's version with CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1994).
29. Ann and Bob are pseudonyms used here to keep private the identity of the stalker, the
victim, and the victim's family.
1994]
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injury on the victim. 3°  Thus, while civil remedies and criminal sanctions
addressing actual physical and emotional harm inflicted on a victim are also
available, these remedies are less valuable to a victim in the sense that some
harm must be incurred before they can be utilized. Because one purpose of
this note is to discuss those remedies a victim might employ to prevent harm,
the remedies for use after actual harm is incurred are deemed irrelevant.
IV. THE INADEQUACY OF OTHER REMEDIES AGAINST STALKING
There are no statistics available in South Carolina indicating the frequency
of stalking because stalking only recently became a criminal offense.
However, a National Institute of Justice report states that, in general, "there
have been as many attacks on public figures by mentally disordered people in
the past [twenty] years as there were in the preceding 175 years."3 In
addition, the behavior preceding some murders, as reported in South Carolina
news accounts, indicates that stalking behavior has occurred in South Carolina
for some time.32 However, until last year there was no satisfactory recourse
available, statutory or civil, for a victim in South Carolina. That is, there
were no remedies which would assist a victim before her stalker inflicted
harm.
A. Civil Remedies
Various civil remedies may be available to a stalking victim. However,
civil remedies are inadequate to protect a victim from the potential danger that
lays ahead. It is doubtful that a pending lawsuit deters a stalker. Additional-
ly, the prospect of receiving a monetary award does little to assuage a victim's
fear of imminent peril. It is reasonable to believe that most victims, instead,
30. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
31. Lane, supra note 5, at 27.
32. For example, Brenda Fellers's estranged husband threatened her in a poem he wrote
and sent to her before he shot her to death in her backyard. Michelle R. Davis, Man
Charged in Wife's Death, THE STATE, June 2, 1993, at 2B. Sixteen year-old Amber Owen
received threatening messages on her answering machine from her ex-boyfriend for months
before he entered her mother's apartment and shot Amber Owen to death. Suellen E. Dean,
'Put a Gun in Every Room,' Advises Mother of Slain Teen, THE STATE, August 22, 1993, at
4B. Finally, Lisa Woodfin Smith moved and obtained an unlisted phone number in an
attempt to divert the harassment of her ex-husband following their divorce. But her attempts
were to no avail; he shot her to death outside a shopping mall approximately four months
later. Suellen E. Dean, Woman Slain at Spartanburg Mall; Ex-Husband Held, THE STATE,
July 10, 1993, at lB (reporting that the stalker yelled as he shot the victim: "Where are you
going to run now, Lisa?"). No article reported that any of the victims had attempted to utilize
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would rather receive assurances of safety from the future actions of their
stalker.
Moreover, one expert on stalking states that a victim who has her stalker
arrested should encourage his prosecution and imprisonment: "'As a general
rule, [arresting but failing to prosecute or imprison the stalker is] perceived by
the mentally ill stalker as a confirmation of the relationship, and by the less
seriously ill stalker as an angering challenge.'"" Consequently, it is
reasonable to believe that a civil lawsuit against the stalker could bring about
the same attitude.
While this discussion includes an analysis of Ann's situation in relation
to the following civil actions, it is this author's belief that they are all
inadequate.
1. Assault
Often plaintiffs bring actions in tort for assault and battery. However, a
victim can bring an action in tort for assault alone, even though her stalker has
committed no battery." A victim can prove assault by showing that her
stalker's actions placed her in "reasonable fear of bodily harm." 35 Although
assault is an intentional tort, a victim need not prove that her stalker intended
to place her in such fear if her stalker's actions were reckless."
A victim must prove more than threatening words to prove the existence
of reasonable fear of bodily harm.37 In Brooker v. Silverthorne the South
33. Puente, supra note 10, at 9A (quoting stalking expert, Dr. Park Dietz).
34. The South Carolina Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for assault in Griner
v. Columbia Creamery Co., 118 S.C. 225, 110 S.E. 116 (1921), when employees of the
defendant company assaulted the plaintiff. In Griner the supreme court failed to discuss in
any detail the civil cause of action for assault but focused instead on whether or not an agency
relationship existed whereby the defendant company could be held liable for the assault by its
employees. Id. at 227-28, 110 S.E. at 117. More recently the South Carolina Court of
Appeals recognized assault independent from battery in Gathers v. Harris Teeter Supermarket,
Inc., 282 S.C. 220, 317 S.E.2d 748 (Ct. App. 1984); the court found that the trial judge had
properly distinguished the torts of assault and battery in the jury instructions. Id. at 230, 317
S.E.2d at 755.
35. Herring v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 222 S.C 226, 241, 72 S.E.2d 453, 458 (1952)
(per curiam); see also Gathers, 282 S.C. at 230, 317 S.E.2d at 754-55 (citing Herring to
define assault). Interestingly, in 1931 the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the definition
of assault "as any improper familiarity with a female against her consent." Kirven v. Kirven,
162 S.C. 162, 169, 160 S.E. 432, 435 (1931).
36. See Herring, 222 S.C. at 241, 72 S.E.2d at 458.
37. Brooker v. Silverthorne, 111 S.C. 553, 557, 99 S.E. 350, 351 (1919) ("Words never
constitute an assault, is a time-honored maxim." (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (1880) [hereinafter COOLEY]). A plaintiff can rely upon threaten-
ing words alone only when the defendant has a legal or contractual duty to protect the plaintiff
from insult, abusive language, or assault as found in carrier-passenger relationships. See id. at
7
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Carolina Supreme Court distinguished an assault from a threat, stressing that
the difference which exists is due to "the reluctance of the law to give a cause
of action for mere words. "38 The court observed that an assault "must be
resisted on the instant" while a "threat only promises a future injury;" a threat
provides ample time to protect oneself from the injury.39
Additionally, the Brooker court noted that a threat is actionable when a
plaintiff can prove that the threat was "adequate" in law to produce the
resulting damage.40 A threat is adequate in law when the threat is
of such nature and made under such circumstances as to affect the mind of
a person of ordinary reason and firmness, so as to influence his conduct;
or it must appear that the person against whom it is made was peculiarly
susceptible to fear, and that the person making the threat knew and took
advantage of the fact that he could not stand as much as an ordinary
person.
41
The court did not state whether an action for a threat is distinct from an action
for an assault or whether the threatening language at issue rose to the level of
an assault. However, it appears that the standard by which one can prove an
action for a threat would also support the reasonable fear requirement in an
action for assault.
In Brooker the supreme court found that the defendant's conduct was not
adequate when he proclaimed over a telephone to the plaintiff, a telephone
operator: "You God damned woman! None of you attend to your business."
and "You are a God damned liar. If I were there, I would break your God
damned neck."42 The court found that nothing in the defendant's statements
expressed an intention to go to where the plaintiff was to injure her. Nor was
there any evidence that the defendant knew that the plaintiff was peculiarly
susceptible to fear.43
558, 99 S.E. at 352.
[A] carrier's liability for abusive language to a passenger is exceptional, on
account of the special and peculiar relations, obligations, and duties existing
between carrier and passenger, which differ in kind and degree from almost every
other legal or contractual relation, since the carrier is in duty bound to protect his
passengers from assault or insult by his servants, and to afford them courteous and
respectful treatment.
Id. (citing Lipman v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 108 S.C. 151, 93 S.E. 714 (1917); Cave v.
Seaboard Airline Ry., 94 S.C. 282, 77 S.E. 1017 (1913)).
38. Id. at 557, 99 S.E. at 351 (quoting COOLEY, supra note 37, at 29).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 558, 99 S.E. at 352.
41. Id. at 558-59, 99 S.E. at 352 (citing Grimes v. Gates, 47 Vt. 594 (1873)).
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A threat of harm other than physical violence may be actionable as an
assault when physical or bodily damages arise directly and proximately
therefrom. In Turner v. ABC Jalousie Co.4" the plaintiff and her husband
entered into a contract with the defendant whereby the defendant agreed to
deliver and install aluminum siding on the couple's home for a special sales
price. The defendant returned to the couple's home approximately one hour
after executing the contract to alert them that the siding would cost approxi-
mately $2300 more than originally contracted for. When the couple refused
to agree to a new contract, the defendant became enraged "and in a loud and
threatening voice, and with vile, profane and abusive language, threatened to
bring suit against the [couple], sell their said dwelling house and throw them
and their children into the street."45 Consequently, the plaintiff became
greatly frightened, went into shock, and required medical treatment because
her nervous system had collapsed. Additionally, the plaintiff remained highly
nervous after that occasion, lost time from her employment, and was unable
to perform her duties in the usual manner.46
The supreme court held that the plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of
action because it alleged a physical or bodily injury. a7 The court focused its
analysis on the damage the plaintiff suffered rather than the nature of the
defendant's threats. The court did not address whether this case presented a
cause of action for assault or for threats. Recognizing that injury to one's
nervous system may result from "an attack of sudden fright, or an exposure
to imminent peril," 48 the court held that an injury of this nature is a physical
one, actionable in tort.49 In addition, the victim is entitled to punitive
damages if there is proof that the tortfeasor acted recklessly, evidencing
"malice or the conscious disregard of [the victim's] rights.""
Over the course of six years, Ann and her family could not bring an
action for assault against Bob because his threats were no more than mere
words. While his comments were disturbing enough to cause worry and fear
in Ann and her family, they were not actionable because they did not indicate
imminent danger. In fact, it is questionable whether an assault action would
lie for Bob's threats to Ann's father that Bob made when he attempted to
locate Ann's house. On the one hand, even though Bob was only three miles
44. 251 S.C. 92, 160 S.E.2d 528 (1968).
45. Id. at 95, 160 S.E.2d at 529.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 97, 160 S.E.2d at 530.
48. Id. at 96, 160 S.E.2d at 530 (quoting Padgett v. Colonial Wholesale Distrib. Co., 232
S.C. 593, 605, 103 S.E.2d 265, 271 (1958)).
49. Turner, 251 S.C. at 97, 160 S.E.2d at 530.
50. Payne v. Bouharoun, 292 S.C. 390, 391, 356 S.E.2d 438, 439 (Ct. App. 1987) (citing
Hall v. Walters, 226 S.C. 430, 85 S.E.2d 729, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 953 (1955); Willis v.
Floyd Brace Co., 279 S.C. 458, 463, 309 S.E.2d 295, 298 (Ct. App. 1983)).
19941
9
Sloan: Standing Up to Stalkers: South Carolina's Antistalking Law Is a G
Published by Scholar Commons, 1994
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
from Ann's home, the threat of peril was neither immediate nor imminent
because Bob did not know their exact whereabouts. On the other hand, the
threat was imminent because Bob had the family's street address and easily
could have located the house had he driven around the area looking at street
names.
2. Trespass
A stalking victim might be able to bring an action in trespass against her
stalker when she suffers damages as a result. To constitute an actionable
trespass a victim must show an affirmative act on the part of her stalker, that
the invasion was intentional, and a threat which was the direct result of the
invasion.5' "Intent is proved by showing that the defendant acted voluntarily
and that he knew or should have known the [trespass] would follow from his
act."52 A stalker is liable even if he did not intend or expect damage to
result from his entry.53
Theoretically, the harm from the trespass could be the unwarrantable
entry onto the land itself.54 Consequently, a victim can sue even if she did
not suffer damages to her property. However, without proof of actual damage
to the property, the victim would be entitled to mere nominal damages.55
Additionally, injunctive relief is available when the trespass to a victim's
land is continuous. 56 "Because of the permanent and recurring nature of the
injury, which cannot otherwise be prevented, the courts should enjoin the
continuous trespasser to protect the landowner's property rights from hurt or
destruction. "5 The South Carolina cases addressing injunctive relief pertain
to situations in which the trespass was created by an instrumentality of the
51. See Snow v. City of Columbia, 305 S.C. 544, 553, 409 S.E.2d 797, 802 (Ct. App.
1991) (citing Alabama Power Co. v. Thompson, 178 So. 2d 525 (Ala. 1965)), cert. denied,
(1992).
52. Id. (citing Snakenberg v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., 299 S.C. 164, 383 S.E.2d 2 (Ct.
App. 1989) (providing that the defendant need only intend the actual trespass and that neither
deliberation, purpose, motive, nor malice is a necessary element of intent)).
53. Id. (citing Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 121 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1954); Lee v. Stewart, 10
S.E.2d 804 (N.C. 1940)).
54. Id. At common law, "[tihe unwarrantable entry on land in the peaceable possession of
another is a trespass, without regard to the degree of force used, the means by which the
enclosure is broken, or the extent of the damage inflicted." Id. at 552, 409 S.E.2d at 802
(citing Lee, 10 S.E.2d at 804). All land held in peaceable possession was deemed to be
enclosed at common law. Id. (citing Harris v. Baden, 17 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1944)).
55. See id. at 553, 409 S.E.2d at 802 (citing Lee, 10 S.E.2d at 804 (N.C. 1940)).
56. Mack v. Edens, 306 S.C. 433, 437, 412 S.E.2d 431, 434 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing
McClellan v. Taylor, 54 S.C. 430, 32 S.E. 527 (1899)), cert. denied, (1992).
57. Id. (citing Carter v. Lake City Baseball Club, 218 S.C. 255, 62 S.E.2d 470 (1950);
Shelley v. Hucks, 282 S.C. 124, 317 S.E.2d 470 (Ct. App. 1984)).
[Vol. 45:383
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defendant rather than the defendant himself." However, it is arguable that
a victim of stalking is entitled to injunctive relief when her stalker continuous-
ly trespasses upon her land because the stalker infringes on her right of
peaceable possession. 9 Furthermore, the victim can receive injunctive relief
through a temporary restraining order available in the South Carolina Rules
of Civil Procedure.'
Fortunately for Ann and her family, a civil action for trespass was
unnecessary because Bob has never located their property. However, many
unfortunate victims, especially victims who are stalked by an ex-spouse, are
taunted by their stalkers in their own backyards.
3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In 1981 the South Carolina Supreme Court expressly recognized a cause
of action in tort for the intentional infliction of emotional distress or
"outrage. "61 However, the court had recognized, either expressly or
impliedly, an action arising out of the current elements of outrage for several
years beforehand.62
To prove the intentional infliction of emotional distress, a victim must
show the following:
(1) [her stalker] intentionally or recklessly inflicted severe emotional
distress or was certain or substantially certain that such distress would
result from his conduct; (2) the conduct was so "extreme and outrageous"
as to exceed "all possible bounds of decency" and must be regarded as
"atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community;" (3) the
actions of [her stalker] caused [the victim's] emotional distress; and (4) the
emotional distress suffered by the [victim] was "severe" so that "no
reasonable man could be expected to endure it." 63
58. See, e.g., Mack, 306 S.C. 433, 412 S.E.2d 431 (property owner's downstream pond
flooded plaintiff's property); Snow, 305 S.C. 544, 409 S.E.2d 797 (city's leaking pipe
damaged plaintiff's residence).
59. See Mack, 306 S.C. at 437, 412 S.E.2d at 434 (granting injunctive relief because "[i]f
a court refuses to restrain [defendant] from backing water on [plaintiff's] land, [plaintiff] will
lose the right to peaceable possession of his land").
60. S.C. R. Cw. P. 65(b). See generally infra notes 126-33 and accompanying text,
explaining how a victim can obtain a TRO in South Carolina.
61. Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.C. 157, 162, 276 S.E.2d 776, 778 (1981) (adopting the rule of
liability provided in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965)).
62. Id. at 161, 276 S.E.2d at 778 (citing Hudson v. Zenith Engraving Co., 273 S.C. 766,
259 S.E.2d 812 (1979); Bellamy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 269 S.C. 578, 239
S.E.2d 73 (1977); Rhodes v. Security Fin. Corp., 268 S.C. 300, 233 S.E.2d 105 (1977);
Turner v. ABC Jalousie Co., 251 S.C. 92, 160 S.E.2d 528 (1968)).
63. Ford, 276 S.C. at 162, 276 S.E.2d at 778 (quoting Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co.,
1994]
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To prove that the stalker's conduct was "extreme and outrageous" a
victim must prove more than simply the stalker acted with a criminal or
tortious intent or that he intended to inflict emotional distress.' Proof that
the stalker's "conduct has been characterized by 'malice,' or a degree of
aggravation which would entitle the [victim] to punitive damages for another
tort" is insufficient to impose liability.' Such proof alone does not present
a situation in which the "conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. " '6
Whether a stalker's conduct meets the test for liability is a question for the
court. 67
South Carolina courts have not provided many guidelines as to what type
of conduct meets this test. However, a verbal assault or a hostile, abusive
encounter by the stalker might amount to sufficient outrageous conduct,68
especially when the victim establishes a pattern of verbal assaults and abusive
encounters taking place over a substantial length of time.
69
Finally, physical illness or some other non-mental damage is not essential
to recovery in this action. 70 However, "where physical harm is lacking, the
courts should look initially for more in the way of extreme outrage as an
assurance that the mental disturbance claimed is not fictitious."
71
Whether Ann could have successfully brought an outrage action against
Bob is questionable. Ann should have no difficulty in proving that Bob's
401 A.2d 148 (Me. 1979)) (citations omitted).
64. See Hudson, 273 S.C. at 770, 259 S.E.2d at 814 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 46 cmt. d).
65. See id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d).
66. Id.
67. Andrews v. Piedmont Air Lines, 297 S.C. 367, 371, 377 S.E.2d 127, 129 (Ct. App.
1989) (per curiam) (citing Butts v. AVX Corp., 292 S.C. 256, 355 S.E.2d 876 (Ct. App.
1987)).
68. See Hudson, 273 S.C. at 770, 259 S.E.2d at 814.
69. See Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.C. 157, 166, 276 S.E.2d 776, 780 (1981). The supreme
court upheld the jury verdict for the plaintiff based upon "evidence [that was] susceptible of
the inference that the conduct complained of herein was not a mere complaint by a dissatisfied
homeowner, but was instead a continuing pattern of highly questionable conduct over a period
of almost two years." Id. Plaintiff contended that defendant "orally accosted her with insulting
and/or profane remarks on no less than seven different occasions." Id. at 163, 276 S.E.2d at
779. Additionally, the South Carolina Court of Appeals has held that the following acts
do not constitute outrageous conduct: violating a statute or lying, Todd v. South Carolina
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 283 S.C. 155, 173, 321 S.E.2d 602, 612 (Ct. App. 1984), rev'd
on other grounds, 287 S.C. 190, 336 S.E.2d 472 (1985), and negligence in performing one's
duty, Caddel v. Gates, 284 S.C. 481, 327 S.E.2d 351 (Ct. App. 1984).
70. Ford, 276 S.C. at 157, 276 S.E.2d at 776.
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conduct inflicted severe emotional distress on Ann and her family. However,
Ann may have encountered difficulty proving that her stalker intended to
produce such a result because many stalkers suffer from mental infirmity.
72
B. Criminal Laws
While civil remedies are inadequate to protect victims from the potential
dangers that lay ahead, most of the criminal laws do little to aid victims either.
The following discussion delineates the criminal laws predating the antistalking
law which do, indeed, address stalking activities. However, with the
exception of the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act, these laws involve
misdemeanors which appear trivial in nature and are not zealously enforced.
Additionally, not all stalking activities fit neatly into the activities proscribed
by these laws.
While the antistalking law is also a misdemeanor,73 its passage reflects
the state's awareness of the seriousness of the crime. The legislature's
decision to recognize stalking as a crime separate from other crimes suggests
the urgency of this issue. Consequently, public awareness has increased,
resulting in pressure on the law enforcement community to react quickly when
addressing stalkings. The attention that Ann received from the police after six
years of tribulation exemplifies police response to the public's new awareness
and the effectiveness of the law.74
1. Protection from Domestic Abuse Act
The South Carolina Protection from Domestic Abuse Act75 provided a
stalking victim something similar to the antistalking law. However, the
Domestic Abuse Act is applicable only to those situations where a victim's
72. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing a stalker's mental condition).
73. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
74. The years proceeding the passage of this law were agonizing for Ann and her family.
On one occasion, the police told Ann that they could not respond to the threats Bob made to
her over the phone. Instead, they could only advise Ann to run in the opposite direction and
find a crowd of people if she encountered Bob in public. In contrast, the police responded
quickly to her father's plea for help after South Carolina's enactment of the antistalking law.
The police arrested Bob within days after his threat made over the phone was reported.
One should note, however, that the new zealousness with which the police are enforcing
the new law could be detrimental to the recognition of the stalking phenomenon. Police may
use this law as another weapon against domestic abusers even though not all such abusers fit
the definition of a stalker. See Westen, supra note 3 and accompanying text. Misapplication
of this law will erode its reliability and its effectiveness. Therefore, the police must exercise
careful judgment when determining whether to charge an accused with stalking.
75. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-4-10 to -130 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
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stalker is a spouse, ex-spouse, parent, child, and certain other relatives.
7 6
This scenario may seem common, but it is not the most prevalent.77 The law
excludes from its protection a victim of stalking by an ex-boyfriend or a
relative stranger, like Bob.
A victim can petition the Family Court for an order of protection pursuant
to the Domestic Abuse Act.7" The order may enjoin the stalker from
attempting to communicate with his victim or entering her place of residence,
employment, or education 79 for up to six months.8" A victim may file a
petition for this order with a magistrate in the event the Family Court is not
in session." Additionally, the court can extend the six month period upon
a motion by the victim and a showing of good cause.'
The petition for the order of protection must allege abuse to the petitioner,
a family member, or a household member and can be filed by either the victim
or a member of her household. 3 The definition of abuse includes the threat
of physical harm.A If good cause is shown, then the court may hold an
emergency hearing on the petition within twenty-four hours of service of a
petition upon the stalker.8" Otherwise the hearing is held within fifteen days
of the victim's petition.
8 6
The court will issue the order of protection upon proof by a preponder-
ance- of the evidence of the allegation of abuse: "A prima facie showing of
immediate and present danger of bodily injury, which may be verified by
supporting affidavits, shall constitute good cause for purposes of this
section. "8 Violation of the order of protection is a criminal offense
punishable by thirty days in jail or a fine of two hundred dollars. 8 Alterna-
76. Id. § 20-4-209(b).
77. A 1991 Justice Department study of violence against women revealed that the
offenders are as follows: husbands - 9%; ex-husbands - 35%; boyfriends/ex-boyfriends-
32%. Nightline, supra note 4.
78. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-40. The Act expressly requires the clerk of court to provide
simplified forms to facilitate the application process for those not represented by counsel. Id.
§ 20-4-40(e).
79. Id. § 20-4-60(a)(2).
80. Id. § 20-4-70.
81. Id. § 20-4-30.
82. Id. § 20-4-70 (requiring notice to the subject of the order as well).
83. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-40(a) to -(b).
84. Id. § 20-4-20(a).
85. See id. § 20-4-50(a).
86. Id. § 20-4-50(b) (upon the finding of no good cause or when a victim fails to request
the emergency hearing, a victim may request and the court will grant a hearing to be held
within fifteen days; the respondent must receive service of the petition at least five days prior
to the hearing or the court can grant a continuance).
87. Id. § 20-4-50(a).
88. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60(b).
[Vol. 45:383
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tively, violation of the order may constitute contempt of court punishable by
a maximum of one year in jail, a fine of up to fifteen hundred dollars, or
both.89
Additionally, a victim of stalking by her spouse or ex-spouse can receive
a temporary restraining order against him pending the termination of an action
for divorce, or a final order thereupon.' The order would enjoin her ex-
husband from "in any manner interposing any restraint upon the personal
liberty of, or from harming, interfering with or molesting, [his victim] during
the pendency of the suit or after final judgment."91 An individual seeking
such relief must show facts and circumstances entitling her to relief.' The
standard to prove entitlement to relief is not expressed in the statute.
However, the supreme court indicated that one must prove evidence of
physical harm done or threatened to the victim-petitioner or that the ex-spouse
has previously interfered with the petitioner's personal liberty or has molested
her.93
2. Disturbing Schools
Stalking behavior often includes surveillance of the victim by the stalker.
Consequently, a victim who is followed to school could ask the police to arrest
her stalker if he is loitering about a school or is acting in an obnoxious manner
there. 94 This law is inapplicable to a stalker who is on the school premises
for business reasons and has permission to be there from the principal or the
president of the institution.9' For example, although Bob followed Ann on
campus, this law provided Ann no relief because her stalker was a fellow
student. Finally, a person found guilty of this law is guilty of a misdemeanor
and must pay a fine between one hundred and one thousand dollars. 96
Alternatively, the individual may be imprisoned in the county jail for thirty to
ninety days. 7
3. Trespass
Trespass was not an issue in Ann's situation because Ann and her family
89. Id. § 20-4-60(b).
90. Id. § 20-3-110.
91. See id. (referring to divorce suits).
92. Odom v. Odom, 248 S.C. 144, 147, 149 S.E.2d 353, 355 (1966).
93. Id. at 147, 149 S.E.2d at 355.
94. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-420(1)(b)-(c) (Law. Co-op. 1985). This law is applicable to
any school or college.
95. Id. § 16-17-420(2).
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made certain that her whereabouts were unknown to Bob after he left the state.
In addition, his attempt to locate her family's residence was unsuccessful.
However, a victim may have her stalker arrested if he enters her dwelling,
place of business, or the premises of another without legal cause or good
excuse and has been warned not to do so within the previous six months.98
A victim may also have a stalker arrested even if he has not been warned if
the person in possession of the property orders or requests the stalker to leave
and the stalker refuses to do so without legal cause or good excuse." Upon
conviction, the stalker will be imprisoned for up to thirty days or fined up to
two hundred dollars."' It is important to note that the statute provides relief
in the form of a monetary fine or imprisonment; the landowner may not
herself eject the trespasser.' 1o
4. Public Disorderly Conduct
A stalker who conducts himself in a disorderly or boisterous manner or
uses obscene or profane language in any public place or gathering is guilty of
a misdemeanor and can be fined up to one hundred dollars or imprisoned up
to thirty days."°  The supreme court indicated that an arrest under this
provision of the statute requires the utterance of fighting words. °3 For
example, the supreme court upheld a finding of probable cause to arrest two
men for a violation of this statute in State v. Roper."4 The police arrested
the men when they jumped from their car and shouted profanities in a
residential neighborhood. 5
This law also was unavailable to Ann and her family because it only
applies to public occurrences. Ann never saw Bob in public after he moved
out of state. Therefore, his profane language and menacing utterances in his
letters and phone calls went unpunished.
98. Id. § 16-11-620. See generally City of Greenville v. Peterson, 239 S.C. 298, 303,
122 S.E.2d 826, 828 (1961) (providing that the predecessor statute was "clearly for the
purpose of protecting the rights of the owners or those in control of private property"), rev'd
on other grounds, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
99. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-620.
100. Id.
101. Town of Springdale v. Butler, 299 S.C. 276, 279, 384 S.E.2d 697, 698 (1989).
102. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-530. This statute also applies to the use of obscene or
profane language within hearing distance of any schoolhouse or church. Id.
103. State v. Perkins, 306 S.C. 353, 354, 412 S.E.2d 385, 386 (1991) (reversing a
conviction of appellants who voiced their objections to sheriff's officers because the record
indicated no use of fighting words).
104. 274 S.C. 14, 260 S.E.2d 705 (1979).
105. Id. at 17, 260 S.E.2d at 706.
(Vol. 45:383
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5. Breach of Peace
A magistrate may have a stalker arrested who disturbs the peace, utters
menaces, or is an otherwise dangerous and disorderly person. 06 A stalker
may be held in jail until he is tried before the court of general sessions when
the offense is of a high and aggravated nature."° Alternatively, a stalker
may be tried by the magistrate and required to post a peace bond. 08
Certainly, this law appears to provide a remedy for stalking victims such
as Ann. The law makes threats, in and of themselves, criminal offenses.
Facially, it appears to cover threats made in letters or over the phone because
the law neither requires the threats to be made in public or with the ability to
carry out the threat. However, this law is rarely used and was not used in
Ann's situation.
Interestingly, the only case cited in the code annotation for this law is
from 1850, in which South Carolina's high court upheld the defendant's
indictment for an "affray." " The court defined "affray" in State v. Sumner
as "the fighting of two or more persons, in some public place, to the terror of
the people. If the fight be in some private place, it is no affray, but an
assault.""" The Sumner decision indicates that the law requires the threat
to be made in public. Consequently, it appears to provide the same relief as
that in the public disorderly conduct law outlined above. Thus, the police's
use of the latter might explain the former's infrequent use.
The police never offered to arrest Bob under this provision when she first
contacted them approximately six years ago. In fact, a police officer confided
during a phone interview for this note that it is rare to see this law en-
forced." In addition, he stated that it is even rarer to see a magistrate issue
a peace bond pursuant to the law.I"
6. Unlawful Uses of Telephone
Probably the most common form of stalking is the unwelcome phone call.
A stalking victim can have her stalker arrested for communicating on the
phone words which are "of a profane, vulgar, lewd, lascivious, or an indecent
nature" communicating by phone an "obscene, vulgar, indecent, profane,
106. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-5-150 (Law. Co-op. 1989).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. State v. Sumner, 36 S.C.L. (5 Strob.) 53 (1850) (per curiam).
110. Id. at 56.
111. Telephone Interview with an anonymous source, Richland County Sheriff's Depart-
ment, Nov. 1, 1993.
112. Id. See generally infra notes 153-60 and accompanying text (discussing the adequacy
of peace bonds as an alternative to stalking violations).
19941 399-
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suggestive, or immoral message[;]" or threatening by phone any unlawful act
with the intent to intimidate, harass or coerce the victim." 3  The South
Carolina Supreme Court indicated that in construing this statute the court
defines these words as they are "generally defined and understood."" 4 The
supreme court provided further that the unsolicited telephonic message must
be obscene, imminently threatening, or harassing.115
Additionally, the stalker can be arrested for repeatedly telephoning the
victim "for the purpose of annoying or harassing [the victim] or his [or her]
family."" 6 Violation of this law is a felony, and the punishment is a fine
in the court's discretion or imprisonment for not more than thirty days."1
7
This law was available to Ann and her family because Bob repeatedly
telephoned Ann's family to threaten and harass them. However, Ann's stalker
made his telephone calls from out of state. Thus, a warrant for his arrest
would be outstanding until he entered the state. While his entry into the state
would ensure imprisonment upon notice of his arrival, notice of his arrival
would not be certain until his actions alerted the police. Moreover, it is
unlikely that a violation of this law warrants the immediate attention of the
police, as does the stalking law.
7. Eavesdropping or Peeping
A stalking victim can have her stalker arrested if he invades her privacy
by eavesdropping or spying and if these activities occur on the victim's private
property." 8 A stalker who eavesdrops on or about his victim's premises or
enters her premises to eavesdrop is guilty of a misdemeanor." 9 Consequent-
ly, the stalker must pay a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, must be
imprisoned for not more than three years, or both."
Additionally, the same penalties are available for stalkers who are
113. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-430(A)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
114. State v. Brown, 274 S.C. 506, 508, 266 S.E.2d 64, 65 (1980) (providing that the
statute sought to protect one's privacy interest "from an invasion made in a shocking
manner").
115. Id.
116. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-430(A)(2).
117. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-430(B)(1). The stalker also can be arrested for calling his
victim and intentionally failing to hang up for the purpose of interfering with her telephone
service, a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $100 or imprisonment for not
more than 30 days. See id. § 16-17-430(A)(3), (B)(2).
118. See id. § 16-17-470; see also Herald Publishing Co. v. Barnwell, 291 S.C. 4, 12-13,
351 S.E.2d 878, 883 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the statute was inapplicable to the conduct
of newspaper reporters who eavesdropped during acity council proceeding because "the
reporters were on public property and not 'on or about the premises of another'").
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"Peeping Toms."' A Peeping Tom is someone who "peeps through
windows or doors or other like places, on or about the premises of another,
for the purpose of spying upon or invading the privacy of the persons spied
upon and the doing of any acts of a similar nature, tending to invade the
privacy of such persons. "" However, this statute only applies to incidents
occurring on private property." Thus, Bob did not violate this law because
he never came onto Ann's property.
C. Temporary Restraining Orders
A common tool utilized in stalking situations is the civil temporary
restraining order (TRO), which merits special attention. In South Carolina a
circuit court judge" 4 can issue a TRO prohibiting the stalker from contacting
or following his victim during the pendency of the order."Z
In South Carolina a victim desiring a TRO must pay a filing fee, 6 and
file a motion for the order with the clerk of the circuit court in her coun-
ty.127 The victim may alternatively file directly with a judge when the judge
permits. 28 A judge can immediately grant the motion for a TRO in a
stalking situation when "it clearly appears.., that immediate and irreparable
injury, loss or damage will result to the [victim] before notice can be served
[to the stalker] and a hearing had thereon."29 The victim must show
immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage from specific facts by
affidavit or verified complaint. 30
Once granted the TRO will expire after ten days of entry into the record
unless the court extends that time "for a like period" upon a showing of good
cause.' A hearing regarding a temporary injunction against the stalker




124. People often mistakenly believe that a magistrate can issue a TRO. However,
magistrates only can issue peace bonds when offenders breach the peace, see supra notes 106-
12 and accompanying text, or protective orders pursuant to the Protection Against Domestic
Abuse Act, see supra notes 75-93 and accompanying text.
125. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 65; see also infra note 170 and accompanying text (regarding the
increased penalty for stalkers who continue their stalking activities in violation of an outstand-
ing TRO).
126. Richland County requires a $55 filing fee for all new motions filed. (Telephone
interview with Richland County Clerk, Nov. 1, 1993).
127. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 3(a), 5(e).
128. See S.C. R. Crv. P. 5(e).
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notice. '32 Temporary injunctions are issued in contemplation of a hearing
requesting permanent relief, and it is customary for them to continue until
completion of the trial. 
33
There are no South Carolina cases contemplating the issuance of a
permanent injunction in harassment situations. In addition, there are no cases
discussing situations in which a court may grant a TRO in order to prevent
physical injury to its applicant. However, it is reasonable to believe that the
latter is relatively common. Ann and her family obtained a TRO against Bob
when he arrived in her hometown. However, a TRO is not an effective tool
in providing relief from further harassment and potential harm.
The skepticism surrounding TROs results from the appearance of
arbitrariness and the lack of seriousness given to most TRO violations.'34
In most states a TRO violation amounts to a civil violation, a mere contempt
of court charge, rather than a criminal violation.'35 Consequently, a victim
is not entitled to immediate relief upon a TRO violation. Police do not have
authority to arrest a stalker in violation of a civil order unless the stalker
simultaneously engages in criminal conduct, for example, trespass or public
disorderly conduct. Therefore, the victim is left unprotected from her stalker
because not all TRO violations are coupled with criminal activity.
To obtain relief from a TRO violation in South Carolina, a victim must
first petition the court that granted the order and seek to hold her stalker in
contempt of court.'36  Upon notice to the stalker, the court will hold a
132. See id. The court will dissolve the TRO if the victim does not apply for a temporary
injunction during the TRO hearing. See id.
133. See Helsel v. City of North Myrtle Beach, 307 S.C. 29, 32, 413 S.E.2d 824, 826
(1992).
134. "The consequences of violating [Canada's proposed antistalking law] would ... be
much more clearly spelled out for would-be stalkers who are unimpressed with the arbitrari-
ness and lack of consequences which are thought to accompany violations of restraining
orders." Outlawing Stalkers, supra note 7, at A4. See generally Wayne E. Bradburn, Jr.,
Comment, Stalking Statutes: An Ineffective Legislative Remedy for Rectifying Perceived
Problems with Today's Injunction System, 19 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 271, 279-81 (1992)
*(discussing the police preference for arbitration rather than arrest in TRO violation situations).
135. Thirty-one states classify the violation of a TRO as civil contempt. Twenty states and
the District of Columbia classify the violation as criminal contempt. In 11 states a violation is
both civil and criminal contempt. Peter Finn, Statutory Authority in the Use and Enforcement
of Civil Protection Orders Against Domestic Abuse, 23 PAM. L.Q. 43, 55 (1989).
136. The South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide penalties for TRO
violations. Thus, courts must look to the common law of England for guidance. See S.C.
CODE ANN. § 14-1-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976). The state supreme court has held that the power
to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts. State v. Buchanan, 279 S.C. 194, 196, 304
S.E.2d 819, 820 (1983) (citing Curlee v. Howle, 277 S.C. 377, 287 S.E.2d 915 (1982)).
Additionally, a person's wilful disobedience of a court's prior decree constitutes contempt.
Edwards v. Edwards, 254 S.C. 466, 469, 176 S.E.2d 123, 124 (1970) (citing Long v.
McMillan, 226 S.C. 598, 86 S.E.2d 477 (1955)).
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hearing on the issue of contempt at which the stalker is permitted to show
good cause for his violation. The court must find that the stalker was guilty
of contempt before a sentence can be imposed: "The record must be clear and
specific as to the acts or conduct upon which such finding is based." 
137
Once the stalker is found guilty of contempt, the court will hold him in either
civil contempt"' or criminal contempt,"39 depending upon the nature of the
sentence imposed. A contempt charge results in either a fine or imprisonment,
both of which are meted out in the discretion of the court."40 Because of the
seriousness surrounding most situations warranting a TRO, it is likely that a
court would hold a stalker in criminal contempt and impose imprisonment
rather than a fine.
South Carolina's TRO is an ineffective remedy to stalking for many
reasons. First, it may be difficult for victims to obtain a TRO due to
procedures surrounding its issuance. For example, many harassment victims
are unaware that only circuit court judges can issue TROs.' 4 ' In addition,
victims may not possess the funds necessary to pay the court filing fee.
Furthermore, the court rules neither require clerks of court to assist victims
proceeding pro se in filing their motions, nor do they mandate the education
of clerks to deal with the sensitive issues surrounding TRO applications.142
This problem is exacerbated because victims unable to afford the filing fee are
less likely to be able to afford a lawyer to explain the process to them.
Secondly, a victim is not provided immediate relief, such as police assistance,
upon the TRO violation because it is a civil violation. Unfortunately, "most
[stalking] victims assume that a violation will result in the immediate arrest of
the stalker. Often these mistaken assumptions lead to dangerous and
sometimes fatal consequences." 43
137. Edwards, 254 S.C. at 468, 176 S.E.2d at 124.
138. A civil contempt charge requires the violator to pay a per diem fine or to serve time in
jail until he complies with the order. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, § 2.8(1), at 130 (2d
ed. 1993). This penalty is the means by which a court can force compliance with its order.
Id.
139. A criminal contempt charge will result in the imposition of a set fine or imprisonment
to punish the violator for his disobedience of the court order. Id.
140. See Greenwood County v. Shay, 202 S.C. 16, 23, 23 S.E.2d 825, 828 (1943)
(providing that a court or judge granting an injunction is vested with "large discretion in
enforcing obedience to its mandate"); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-5-320 (Law. Co-op.
1976) (providing that circuit court judges may fine or imprison one guilty of contempt of
"authority in any cause or hearing before the [court]").
141. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
142. Bradburn, supra note 134, at 273. Compare S.C. R. Civ. P. 65(b) (providing no
special assistance) with S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-40(e) (Law. Co-op. 1985) (mandating that
clerks of court must provide simplified forms to victims when filing for a protective order
pursuant to the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act).
143. Bradburn, supra note 134, at 274.
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Finally, stalking usually occurs when most courts are not in session, in
the evening or over the weekend." While South Carolina provides that a
victim can file a TRO motion with a circuit judge instead of the court, the
judge's permission is required.'45 It is unlikely that most victims personally
know a judge with whom they can file, and thus, only those victims with
access to a lawyer can take advantage of this provision. Consequently, "the
victim's only protection is a police officer's unenforceable warning to the
stalker to stay away from the victim and the victim's premises."146
V. ALTERNATIVES TO ANTISTALKING LAWS
Some critics dislike antistalking laws because they fear that the laws have
potential to abuse the rights of innocent people. Two viable alternatives to
antistalking laws are the implementation of more stringent TROs and the
legislative adoption of civil peace bonds. These alternatives may appease
antistalldng law critics because they are less nebulous in the activities they
proscribe. However, these alternatives leave gaps in victim relief, which can
only be filled by antistalking laws.
A. Temporary Restraining Orders with Teeth
While some commentators laud the passage of antistalking laws as a
needed alternative to the TRO, 47 at least one commentator suggested that
legislatures should toughen the penalties for violations of TROs instead.' 48
144. Id.; Peter Finn, Statutory Authority in the Use and Enforcement of Civil Protection
Orders Against Domestic Abuse, 23 Faro. L.Q. 43, 58 (1989).
145. See S.C. R. Ci'. P. 5(e).
146. Bradburn, supra note 134, at 274 (criticizing the fact that only 23 states allow judges
to issue after-hour emergency orders).
147. The following statements show some commentators believe the temporariness of the
TRO is simply not enough to protect women from the type of harassment which accompanies
stalking:
"[Tihe problem we found was the temporary restraining orders were simply not enough. We
have husbands showing up, the cops would come, and they'd take him away, and he'd by
back, you know, a day later." Sonya Live, supra note 25 (statement of domestic violence
worker commenting on her experience with TROs). "With a temporary restraining order, it's
generally, at most, 48 hours. And, of course, the perpetrator knows that." Id. (statement of
California state senator Edward Royce agreeing with the statement that restraining orders have
no teeth). "Ask any battered woman who's taken out 5, 10, 20 restraining orders, who now
feels that God or something is on her side, that she can press charges under a stalker law."
Nightline, supra note 4 (statement of Anne Seymour of the National Victims Center, discount-
ing a suggestion that temporary restraining orders are a sufficient remedy to stalking).
148. [I]f there's a pattern, a violation of a court order, that's all you should
need. The problem with court orders is that they're not enforced. It is,
I think, much more effective when some cop knocks on the door of
[Vol. 45:383
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States can toughen TROs by changing the nature of the violation and the
sentencing guidelines. These changes may add the much needed credibility
TROs currently lack in many states.
Changing a TRO violation to a criminal contempt charge, a misdemeanor
permitting arrest, in states where the violation constitutes civil contempt will
permit police to provide the victim with the much needed assistance these
states deny her now: the ability to get the stalker away from her. Arrest
prevents the stalker from harming his victim. A victim would not have to
petition the court to find her stalker in contempt, postponing relief until the
conclusion of the contempt proceeding. Rather, police could arrest the stalker
upon witnessing the violation or upon obtaining a warrant for the stalker's
arrest. Additionally, adding a predetermined penalty such as a fine up to
$1000, a jail sentence up to one year, or both would ensure consistent penalty
distribution for these violations.149 Currently, judges have discretion in
meting out the penalties accompanying a contempt charge.150
However, toughening TROs is not sufficient to protect all individuals
from stalking. Presumably antistalking legislation is written so that a victim
may have her stalker arrested regardless of whether a TRO is in place.
Without antistalking laws, no relief is given to victims who do not take out a
TRO. For example, Laura Black did not take out a TRO against her stalker
because she was afraid that he might retaliate.' Instead, TROs should be
used in conjunction with antistalking laws to provide the victim the greatest
assurance for her safety without abusing the stalker's constitutional rights.
some stalker and says, "Listen, if you violate this court order, if I see
you in that area, I'm going to be on you like ugly on moose."
Nightline, supra note 4 (statement of Professor Jonathan Turley, George Washington
University).
149. See, e.g. Wis. STAT. § 813.125 (7) (West Supp. 1993) (providing a fine of not more
than $1000 or imprisonment for not more than 90 days for a TRO violation).
150. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
151. Linden Gross, Twisted Love: A Deadly Obsession, COSMOPOLITAN, July 1992, at 190.
Black eventually obtained a TRO although she was reluctant to do so. After the court served
the TRO on her stalker, Richard Wade Farley, he panicked and concocted a plot to save "the
relationship."
[Farley] purchased a six-hundred-dollar state-of-the-art semiautomatic shotgun and
fourteen hundred dollars' worth of ammunition for that gun as well as for the
other six he owned. In order to display his arsenal in a manner that would
properly impress Black, he rented a motor home, hoping to lure her inside
somehow so that he could take photographs of their 'domestic interaction.' Farley
figured that if he could establish proof of their relationship, the court would not
issue a permanent restraining order. He even hoped to convince Black to drop the
matter completely.
Id. Nine days later, Farley armed himself from his arsenal, drove to Black's office, and shot
and killed most every one who crossed his path. Farley shot Black in the shoulder, but she
escaped the death that her co-workers did not. Id.
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B. Civil Peace Bonds
Several states provide for civil peace bonds when it is probable that an
individual will engage in an activity causing a breach of peace.152 A peace
bond is a "[t]ype of surety bond required by a judge or magistrate of one who
has threatened to breach the peace or has a history of such misconduct."1
5 3
A person who posts a peace bond forfeits the bond when he carries out the
acts proscribed in the bond.
Peace bonds are statutory animals. Currently, South Carolina employs
peace bonds for criminal disorderly conduct, allowing magistrates to require
the posting of a peace bond upon an individual's arrest. 154 However, it is
arguable that states should employ civil peace bonds as a means to protect
stalking victims instead of imposing a criminal penalty.
Texas permits a magistrate to require a peace bond from an individual
who is accused of threatening to commit an offense.155 A magistrate can
have the accused arrested and brought before him upon information from the
victim under oath "that an*offense is about to be committed against the person
or property of the informant, or of another, or that any person has threatened
to commit an offense" 5 6  Upon a finding that the accused intended to
commit on offense, the magistrate can require the accused to post a bond
conditioned upon his compliance with an order that he will not commit the
offense and "will keep the peace toward the person threatened. ""' The
bond is relinquished upon a given date, not more than one year after
issuance. 15
8
152. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-6-90 (Michie 1990).
153. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1130 (6th ed. 1990).
154. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-5-150 (Law. Co-op. 1989); see also supra note 108 and
accompanying text.
155. See TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 7.01 (West 1977).
156. Id. American Jurisprudence provides that peace bond statutes generally are "phrased
so that an offense threatened or about to be committed against the person or property of the
[victim] affords a basis for the latter's initiating a proceeding to require a peace bond." 12
AM. JUR. 2d Breach of Peace, Etc. § 42 (1964). The stalker's threat against the victim must
be a serious one which would create reasonable apprehension in the victim. See id. One
potential problem with this requirement lies in interpreting when the stalker's actions
constitute a reasonable threat to the victim, necessitating a peace bond. This issue is the heart
of the controversy surrounding antistalking laws.
Additionally, the statutes generally require that the petition be supported by oath,
supported by affirmation, or accompanied by a sworn affidavit. Id. Finally, statutes may
require the affiant to swear "that he [or she] is merely seeking the protection of the law and
not acting from anger or malice." Id.
157. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 7.03. The amount of the bond is in the magis-
trate's discretion; however, guidelines for the magistrate to follow in fixing the bond amount
are provided. See id. art. 7.06.
158. Id. art. 7.03.
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There are several advantages to a peace bond. First, a petition for the
bond can be instituted by the victim instead of the state, whereas the state must
charge an individual with the crime of stalking. This gives the victim control
over the proceeding and the expediency of the process. Second, the threshold
for instituting an action to obtain a peace bond requires fewer acts toward the
victim than does an antistalking law; the peace bond requires only a threat
against the victim. Third, an individual who cannot post the bond is
imprisoned immediately, I 9 offering the same relief of an antistalking law.
Finally, the hearing on the merits for procurement of the bond provides notice
to the accused that his activities are not legitimate in the state's eyes.
Opponents of antistalking laws claim that the law provides a stalker with no
notice that his actions are illegitimate.
However, there are several problems with using peace bonds. First, an
accused who does not post the bond upon a court's order may be imprisoned
for the wrong reason. The accused who does not have a job or other means
to retain a bonding company will spend time in jail due to his lack of money,
not because of his offense. In addition, breach of the bond results in another
civil action. The only remedy available in Texas for breach of a peace bond
is to bring suit against the accused to recover on the bond."6° Consequently,
civil peace bonds suffer the same infirmities as TROs. Therefore, a TRO with
teeth accompanied by antistalking legislation is the best way to address the
issue of stalking.
VI. SOUTH CAROLINA'S ANTISTALKING LAW
In South Carolina the crime of stalking is a misdemeanor.' A person
is guilty of stalking when he or she "wilfully, maliciously, and repeatedly
follow[s] or harass[es] another person and make[s] a credible threat with the
intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or great bodily
injury."62 The statute defines "harasses" as a "knowing and wilful course
of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, or
harasses the person and which serves no legitimate purpose."163 A "course
of conduct" is defined as "a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts
over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. " "
Excluded from course of conduct are constitutionally protected activities"
159. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-6-60 (1982); TExAs CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 7.01
(West 1977).
160. See TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 7.17 (West 1977).
161. See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-1070(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
162. Id. (emphasis added).
163. Id. § 16-3-1070(A)(1) (emphasis added).
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and conduct occurring during labor picketing.' 66 Finally, the statute defines
"credible threat" as "a threat made with the intent and the apparent ability to
carry out the threat so as to cause the person who is the target of the threat to
reasonably fear for his safety."167 The stalker must threaten the life of the
victim or threaten to cause her "great bodily injury.'1 68
A person found guilty of stalking will be imprisoned for not more than
one year, fined not more than one thousand dollars, or both. 169  A person
found guilty of stalking when there is a temporary restraining order prohibiting
the harassment of the victim will be imprisoned for not more than two years,
fined not more than one thousand dollars, or both. 7 ' Repeat offenders will
be imprisoned for not more than three years, fined not more than two thousand
dollars, or both when the activity takes place within seven years of the first
offense and includes the same victim. 1
7
VII. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA'S LAW
South Carolina courts must presume the constitutionality of South
Carolina's antistalking law in the face of any challenge to its constitutional-
ity.' 72 In addition, "[t]he rule has developed that the courts, in applying
rules of statutory construction to legislation which is under constitutional
attack, must do so with a view to bringing the legislation into line with
constitutional requirements, that is, favoring or upholding the legislation rather
than invalidating it."'"' However, it is elementary a statute cannot be
sustained constitutionally when it is vague or overbroad.'74
166. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070(E) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
167. Id. § 16-3-1070(A)(3).
168. See id.
169. Id. § 16-3-1070(B).
170. Id. § 16-3-1070(C). See generally supra notes 125-46 and accompanying text,
regarding the difficulties in obtaining a temporary restraining order and the infirmities with
the TRO process.
171. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
172. See, e.g., Beaufort County v. Jasper County, 220 S.C. 469, 478-79, 68 S.E.2d 421,
426 (1951) (per curiam) (citing Gand v. Walker, 214 S.C. 451, 53 S.E.2d 316 (1949));
Townsend v. Richland County, 190 S.C. 270, 275, 2 S.E.2d 777, 779 (1939). This
"presumption is based on the high respect that the judicial branch of the government holds for
its co-ordinate branch, the legislature." 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 213 (1979).
173. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 219; see also, e.g., Beaufort County, 220 S.C.
at 479, 68 S.E.2d at 426 (citing Caughman v. Columbia Y.M.C.A., 212 S.C. 337, 47 S.E.2d
788 (1948); Greenville Enter., Inc. v. Jennings, 210 S.C. 163, 41 S.E.2d 868 (1947)).
174. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 607 (1973).
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A court will find the South Carolina antistalking law unconstitutionally
vague if the statute "forbids. . . the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application.""17 The South Carolina law forbids an individual from
"wilfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow[ing] or harass[ing] another
person and [from] mak[ing] a credible threat with the intent to place that
person in reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury."176 The law sets
out explicit standards by which an individual will be charged with the crime
of stalking.'" In particular, the law provides definitions for the terms:
"harass,"178 "course of conduct," 179 and "credible threat." 80
However, a court may find the definition of credible threat vague because
it employs a subjective standard to determine its existence. The law defines
credible threat as a threat which causes the victim to reasonably fear for her
safety.' This standard is a subjective one, to be measured by the victim's
feelings and not those of a reasonable person. Consequently, legal behavior
may be indistinguishable from illegal behavior; what may reasonably cause
fear in one person, may not cause fear in another. Therefore, enforcement
risks unfair prosecution and potentially deters constitutionally protected
activity. 1 2
The vagueness flaw exists only with regard to following, because there
is no definition of follow as there is for harass. An individual is guilty of
stalking when he either (1) follows someone and makes a credible threat, or
(2) harasses someone and makes a credible threat.' The law provides an
175. Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961) (quoting Connally v.
General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
176. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
177. See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 607 (holding that although the law before it was not
vague, it "fails to give adequate warning of what activities it proscribes or fails to set out
'explicit standards' for those who must apply it" (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104 (1972))).
178. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 164-66 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. At least one commentator criticizes
antistalking laws with a credible threat reference that also do not provide guidance in
determining by whose standard the threat must be credible. Nightline, supra note 4.
181. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070(A)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
182. See Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 283 (1961) (characterizing
these risks as "vices inherent in an unconstitutionally vague statute") (citing Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); Cline v. Frink
Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926)).
183. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
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objective standard in the definition of harass which arguably cures the
infirmity in the threat standard. The course of conduct defined as harassing
must cause both a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress
and distress to the victim.' 4 This provision employs both an objective and
subjective standard. Because the law provides no such definition for follow,
there is no objective standard by which to measure a victim's fear for her
safety when her stalker follows rather than harasses her. Consequently, the
statute may be found unconstitutionally vague.
B. Overbreadth
A court will find the antistalking law overbroad on its face if it purports
to reach protected, as well as unprotected conduct.'" The conduct pro-




The right of a stalker to follow his victim is addressed by the issues of
privacy and liberty. The stalker possesses the right to be left alone by other
people or to go about his business without interference from the state or its
police.'88  Although his interests are unquestionably strong in the confines
of his home, 89 they are limited on public streets. '9
One limit finds its sauce in the victim's protection. The United States
Supreme Court recognizes the government's interest in protecting its citizens
from crime and undue annoyance. 191 The Court stated that this interest is
both legitimate and compelling. 19 Consequently, a stalker's right to follow
184. See id. § 16-3-1070(A)(1).
185. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972) (citing Zwickler v.
Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967)).
186. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
187. The most relevant definition of "follow" is: "To come or go after: Follow the usher."
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 520 (2d college ed. 1991).
188. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
189. "The State's interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home
is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society." Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455, 471 (1980).
190. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975).
191. E.g., Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1976) (recognizing "a
municipality's power to protect its citizens from crime and undue annoyance by regulating
soliciting and canvassing").
192. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984) (upholding a state juvenile pretrial
detention program implemented to protect the public from the juvenile offenders) (quoting De
Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 155 (1960)).
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his victim without law enforcement interference terminates when he couples
his right with a credible threat of bodily harm to his victim. Once he threatens
his victim he violates the law, and his right to move about freely is constitu-
tionally subordinated.193 Therefore, the state's infringement upon a stalker's
liberty interest is not overbroad on its face. It only limits his right to follow
the victim when the following is coupled with a credible threat of violence.
2. Harassing
The statute defines "harasses" as a "knowing and wilful course of conduct
directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the
person and which serves no legitimate purpose." 194 A determination of
constitutionality must rest upon an analysis of the words "course of conduct,"
defined as "a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing
a continuity of purpose.""95
Stalking includes many specific acts which occur in a pattern over a
period of time. For example, a stalker may make unwelcome phone calls and
visits to the victim; he may send unwelcome correspondence and gifts, despite
having been told not to do so. 96 In addition, it is not uncommon for him
to spy on the victim or to vandalize her property."9 Unquestionably, there
is no constitutional provision guaranteeing a stalker the right to spy, send gifts,
or vandalize. However, the'remaining acts superficially fall within the ambit
of protected speech.
At the outset, it is important to note that phone calls, visits, and
correspondence, may be protected elements of the right to free speech or free
association. To be considered a crime, they must both seriously alarm, annoy,
or harass the victim and serve no legitimate purpose. 19 Moreover, these
acts must be coupled with a credible threat intended to place the victim in
reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury.'99 Therefore, these acts
cannot be analyzed alone, but must be analyzed with the other elements of
stalking.
193. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that police may stop an individual
when they have an articulate, reasonable suspicion that the individual may be involved in
criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26, 30 (1968); see also Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40, 66 (1967) (stating that indicia of criminal intent coupled with evidence of a
crime are "proper factors to be considered in the decision to make an arrest").
194. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070(A)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
195. Id. § 16-3-1070(A)(2).
196. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
197. See id.; see also Sonya Live, supra note 25 (interviewing a stalking victim who's
stalker spied on her daily as she went to and from school).
198. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070(A)(1), (B) (Law. Co-op. 1993).
199. See id. § 16-3-1070(A)(2), (B).
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It is likely that the prohibition of phone calls, visits, and correspondence
directed to a victim's home would survive judicial scrutiny due to the
significance placed on the privacy of an individual's home. The United States
Supreme Court stated in Frisby v. Schultz:2°°
One important aspect of residential privacy is protection of the unwilling
listener. Although in many locations we expect individuals simply to
avoid speech they do not want to hear, the home is different. "That we
are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to
objectionable speech . . . does not mean we must be captives every-
where." Instead, a special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy within
their own walls, which the State may legislate to protect, is an ability to
avoid intrusions. Thus, we have repeatedly held that individuals are not
required to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes and that the
government may protect this freedom.20'
Consequently, the Court has recognized the right of a state to bar the delivery
of certain mail to an unreceptive addressee" and the power of a state to
regulate door-to-door canvasing and solicitation.0 3 It is reasonable to
speculate that the Supreme Court also would recognize the right of a state to
bar phone calls to unreceptive listeners based upon the rationale behind these
rulings.2
Finally, in what appears to be an attempt to ensure the statute's constitu-
tionality, the statute provides: "Constitutionally protected activity is not
included within the meaning of 'course of conduct.'"25 Therefore, the
200. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
201. Id. at 484-85 (quoting Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't., 397 U.S. 728, 738
(1970)) (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Erznoznik v. City of Jackson-
ville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77 (1949)).
202. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737. ("The ancient concept that'a man's home is his castle' into
which 'not even the king may enter' has lost none of its vitality, and none of the recognized
exceptions includes any right to communicate offensively with another." (citing Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967))).
203. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) ("There is, of course, no
absolute right under the Federal Constitution to enter on the private premises of another and
knock on a door for any purpose, and the police power permits reasonable regulation for
public safety.").
204. The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the South Carolina harassing telephone call
statute, providing that "[t]he State has a legitimate interest in prohibiting obscene, threatening
or harassing telephone calls." State v. Brown, 274 S.C. 506, 508, 266 S.E.2d 64, 65 (1980)
(citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Walker v. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 906 (1975); State v. Hagen, 558 P.2d 750 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976)).
205. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. It might appear that the exception created
by this provision swallows the whole. However, an analysis of the statute reveals that the
[Vol. 45:383
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prohibition of harassment should sustain a challenge of facial overbreadth.
3. Threateninge°
A "statute must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to
punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to
protected expression" to survive a constitutional challenge when it infringes
upon the freedom of speech.2' Succinctly put, this provision of the statute
will be void due to overbreadth"8 unless the statute on its face only prohibits
obscenity, profanity, libel, and fighting words or is so interpreted by the South
Carolina courts.2°9 This analysis, however, must focus on the former
rationale because the South Carolina Supreme Court has not yet reviewed the
antistalking statute.
A threat likely falls into the unprotected class of speech termed "fighting
words." Twice in dicta the United States Supreme Court lumped threatening
words together with obscenity and profanity in its discussion of fighting words
as unprotected speech in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire."' Defining fighting
words, the Court stated the following:
The test is what men of common intelligence would understand would be
words likely to cause an average addressee to fight. . . . The English
language has a number of words and expressions which by general consent
are "fighting words" when said without a disarming smile. . . . Such
words, as ordinary men know, are likely to cause a fight. So are
threatening, profane or obscene revilings. Derisive and annoying words
can be taken as coming within the purview of the statute as heretofore
interpreted only when they have this characteristic of plainly tending to
excite the addressee to a breach of the peace. . . . The statute, as
construed, does no more than prohibit . . . words whose speaking
conduct sought to be curtailed by this statute is not constitutionally protected conduct to begin
with.
206. The most relevant definition of "threat" is: "An expression of an intention to inflict
pain, injury, evil, or punishment." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DIcTIONARY 1265 (2d college
ed. 1991).
207. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972).
208. The overbreadth doctrine traditionally does not invalidate the entire statute on its face
even when a portion of the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad. See Broadrick v. Oklaho-
ma, 413 U.S. 601, 615-16 (1973).
209. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). See generally
Gooding, 405 U.S. at 523 ("Our decisions since Chaplinsky have continued to recognize state
power constitutionally to punish 'fighting' words under carefully drawn statutes not also
susceptible of application to protected expression." (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971); Bachellor v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1970); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576
(1969))).
210. 315 U.S. at 573.
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constitutes a breach of the peace by the speaker - including "classical
fighting words," words in current use less "classical" but equally likely to
cause violence, and other disorderly words, including profanity, obscenity
and threats.
2 11
Additionally, in a dissenting opinion to Gormley v. Connecticut State
Department of Adult Probation, Justice White listed threats of physical
violence as a form of unprotected speech.212 Therefore, this provision of the
statute is also within the parameters of constitutionality. Hence, the statute
should withstand a constitutional challenge of overbreadth.
VIII. SOUTH CAROLINA'S LAW: STANDING UP TO CRITICISM
As is common with the passage of any significant piece of legislation, a
great debate about the legitimacy of new antistalking laws surfacing throughout
the country has arisen. Critics of antistalking laws fear that vengeful women
and men could use these laws to harass ex-spouses in domestic cases.2" 3 The
laws' proponents discount this argument as one raised with regard to every law
available to battered and terrorized women.2"' Wherever the cards fall in
this debate, South Carolina's antistalking law withstands most of the criticisms
against these laws.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) expressed concern over the
potential misuse and abuse of antistalking laws in general.1 5 For example,
the ACLU is concerned that such laws may be used as vehicles to "suppress
the rights of political dissidents," to inhibit investigative reporters from
researching a story on a public figure, and to punish fathers, unfairly denied
of visitation rights, who sit in their parked cars outside of their child's school
211. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Chaplinksy, 18 A.2d 754, 762 (N.H.), prob.
juris. noted, 62 S. Ct. 89 (1941), aff'd, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
212. Gormley v. Director, Connecticut State Dep't of Adult Probation, 449 U.S. 1023,
1023 (White, J., dissenting) ("To be sure, a State has a valid interest in protecting its citizens
against unwarranted invasions of privacy. This is especially true when unprotected speech,
such as obscenity or threats of physical violence, is involved." (citing Rowan v. United States
Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, (1970)), denying cert. to 632 F.2d 938 (1980); cf. Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that a federal statute prohibit-
ing threats to the United States President's life is constitutional on its face).
213. "Somebody can now then be charged with a felony because of bad feelings from the
past, and this doesn't seem like the way for us to go." Nightline, supra note 4 (statement of
Linda Wickenkamp, Public Defender).
214. See id. (statement of Lesley Landis, Battered Woman's Advocate) ("It is the defense
of the day in domestic violence courtrooms everywhere that, 'Of course, what we're dealing
with is an estranged wife and a vindictive woman' ..... ).
215. In fact, the ACLU stated that it will challenge the constitutionality of all convictions
under antistalking laws "to ensure that the rights of innocent people are not abused."
Bradburn, supra note 134, at 285 (citing Sonya Live, supra note 25).
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to ensure his wellbeing. 1 6 However, these laws are unlikely to generate
such results.
First, South Carolina's law requires that a pattern of conduct serving no
legitimate purpose be directed at a particular person.2 7  This requirement
excludes political dissidents merely conducting protests at abortion-clinics.
Their protests are legitimate in light of a state's power to regulate abor-
tions.218 Second, this conduct must be coupled by a threat against the life
of the recipient or a threat to cause great bodily harm, made with the intent
and the apparent ability to carry it out.219  This requirement excludes the
ambitious investigative reporter who follows a target, but makes no threat
against the target's life or limb. The same exclusion applies to the worried
father.
An Illinois criminal defense attorney criticized the Illinois antistalking law
that permits a judge to deny bail to an alleged stalker when concluding the
stalker is too dangerous to be freed, emphasizing that this restraint is usually
reserved for murder suspects.' "They think that it creates a punishment
before the crime, or before the ultimate decision as to whether or not a crime
was committed."2 This criticism is inapplicable to South Carolina's law
because the law does not provide for the denial of bail. 2
Others criticize the vagueness of the criminal element of following. These
critics complain that most antistalking laws do not provide a distance require-
ment in the definition of following, creating uncertainty over how close a
stalker may follow his victim before committing a crime.' As previously
discussed, the South Carolina law does not provide a definition for follow-
ing. 4 However, a definitional provision imposing a distance constituting
a stalking offense would be ludicrous. The provision would either be so broad
as to be ridiculous or so narrow as to be ineffective in carrying out the law's
underlying purpose.
216. Sonya Live, supra note 25 (statement of Loren Siegel, ACLU).
217. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070(A)(1), (B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
218. But see Bruce Smith, Abortion Foe Accused of Stalking Clinic Director, THE STATE,
April 2, 1993, at 3B (reporting arrest warrant's allegations that the protestor told the clinic
director that the clinic director better get police protection and a bullet-proof vest).
219. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070(A)(3), (B).
220. Nightline, supra note 4 (statement of Jack Rimland, criminal defense attorney).
221. Id.
222. This consideration is one which ought to be incorporated into the law. See generally
infra notes 235-64 (discussing the inclusion of pretrial detention in the South Carolina law).
223. The course of conduct requirement of antistalking statutes bothers at least one
commentator. Professor Jonathan Turley of George Washington University opined that the
offensive distance is primarily defined by the victim's feelings because most statutes do not
specify the terms of a pattern of conduct. Nightline, supra note 4.
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Alternatively, the South Carolina statute provides that following must be
accompanied by a pattern of conduct, existing over a period of time and
evidencing a continuity of illegitimate purposes.' z  Thus, a stalker who
merely follows his victim, regardless of how closely he does so, does not
violate the law. This provision adequately provides the safeguard that critics
seek in the implementation of a distance requirement.
Finally, antistalking laws which both penalize the mere presence of the
stalker and utilize a subjective standard in the determination of the victim's
reasonable fear are criticized as being too vague.226 South Carolina's
antistalking law requires more than the mere presence of an alleged stalker in
regard to harassment. It requires the stalker's repeated presence to be coupled
with a credible threat that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional
distress; it also must actually cause such distress. 7 Thus, this section may
appear safe from criticism for vagueness. However, the provision penalizing
the following of a victim" 8 arguably is vague. Although the following must
be repeated, the definition of "credible threat" employs a subjective standard
that may be unconstitutionally vague.229 This "credible threat" language is
the South Carolina law's greatest flaw and must be remedied.230
While the debate over the legitimacy of antistalking laws continues, one
fact is certain: The South Carolina antistalking law provided the first adequate
remedy to Ann, her family, and other victims of stalking. Moreover, it
provided the immediate relief Ann and her family required. The police
arrested Bob for stalking because the facts established probable cause to
believe that he stalked Ann and her family. 2 1 First, his willful, malicious,
and repeated harassment of Ann and her family was evidenced by a course of
conduct directed at Ann and her family; Bob's conduct served no legitimate
225. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070(A)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
226. [Tjhis system essentially criminalizes ... the mere presence in an area,
when coupled with reasonable fear .. .on the accusing parties' behalf.
Now, that's a very troubling standard, because not only is it highly
subjective, but it also means that some legal behavior may be indistin-
guishable from some illegal behavior. That leaves it to the police officer
to make the determination whether somebody is a stalker, whether
someone is obnoxious.
Nightline, supra note 4 (statement of Professor Turley).
227. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993)
228. Id.
229. See id.; see also supra notes 175-84 and accompanying text (discussing this provi-
sion's vagueness).
230. See infra notes 233-34 and accompanying text (suggesting a cure for the vagueness).
231. An officer has probable cause to arrest if the facts and circumstances are sufficient to
warrant a prudent man in believing the suspect has committed the crime with which he is
charged. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975); accord Fisher v. Washington Metro.
Area Transit Auth., 690 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1982).
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purpose, and seriously alarmed and annoyed them. Months of daily letters and
late-night phone calls established a pattern of conduct evidencing a continuity
of purpose.
Second, he threatened Ann's father over the phone intending to place him
in fear of death or great bodily injury, and he caused such reasonable fear.
Bob's threat was credible because it was made with the ability to carry out the
threat: He was within three miles of Ann's father's home and had knowledge
of their street address, as evidenced by the letters he sent daily. Furthermore,
the threat was made with the intent to carry it out because the stalker made
efforts to locate the home.
IX. IMPROVEMENTS TO SOUTH CAROLINA'S LAW
The passage of South Carolina's antistalking legislation is a great stride
forward. However, the legislature must not stop there. The state's anti-
stalking law may be unconstitutionally vague in an important respect. In
addition, it fails to address several important issues such as the stalker's
potential violence to the victim in retaliation for his arrest, the stalker's
potential need for psychological counseling, the need of the victim's family for
protection, and the need to protect harassed victims who are just short of being
"stalked."
Addressing these issues will not free the state from stalking. However,
additional initiatives will offer victims added protection and provide help to
stalkers who often need psychological treatment. Therefore, South Carolina
should first rectify the vagueness in its definition of a "credible threat. " '
It also should add to its statute the denial of bail in appropriate cases. It
should require a compulsory mental health evaluation upon a conviction for
stalking to determine if counseling is warranted. It should include threats to
immediate family members in its definition of stalking. It should strengthen
temporary restraining orders, allow them in cases of harassment, and simplify
the process to obtain one. Finally, it should train and educate police officers
regarding the significance and implications of this crime and should instate
"Threat Management Teams" in each county.
A. Curing Vagueness
First, and foremost, the potential unconstitutional vagueness of South
Carolina's law must be corrected. The flaw appears in the definition of
"credible threat" which employs a subjective standard in determining a
violation.233 The simple addition to the definition of "credible threat" of an
232. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070 (A)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
233. See id.; see also supra notes 167-68, 181-84 and accompanying text (discussing the
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objective standard similar to the one found in the definition of "harasses"234
would remedy this problem. The provision should read as follows: A
"credible threat" means a threat made with the intent and the apparent ability
to carry out the threat so as to cause a reasonable person to fear for his safety,
and which threat actually causes the person who is the target of the threat to
fear for his safety.
B. Pretrial Detention
All persons arrested in South Carolina may be entitled to pay bail in
exchange for pretrial release unless they are charged with a capital offense or
an offense punishable by life in prison.u5 Traditionally, these persons were
denied their liberty because their release would not reasonably assure their
appearance at trial. However, a later trend permits pretrial detention in cases
where the individual's release poses a threat to the safety of any person or the
community." A person convicted of stalking poses such a serious threat
to the stalker's victim.
The South Carolina legislature has recognized that the safety of the
community is an interest worthy of protection in the bail and recognizance
section of the code. 7 However, it has failed to develop fully the security
of this interest, especially with respect to stalkings. For example, Chapter 15
of Title 17 addresses public safety, providing that a person charged with a
noncapital offense may be required to post an appearance bond when "the
court determines in its discretion that such a release will not reasonably assure
the appearance of the person as required, or unreasonable danger to the
community will result."18 However, this section only allows a court to
require pretrial detention as an alternative to an appearance bond when it is
reasonably necessary to assure an individual's appearance at trial. 239 A court
may not detain in custody a person who is a danger to the community, but
may only require him to post an appearance bond, to remain in the custody of
a designated person, such as a family member, or to refrain from travel or
language of the statute and its vagueness).
234. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070(A)(1).
235. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 15.
236. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality of
the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, which permits pretrial detention upon a showing that no
release conditions "will reasonably assure ... the safety of any other person and the
community").
237. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-15-10 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
238. Id. § 17-15-10 (emphasis added).
239. Id. § 17-15-10(d). A court may "fi]mpose any other condition[ deemed reasonably
necessary to assure appearance as required, including a condition that the person return to
custody after specified hours." Id.
(Vol. 45:383
36
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss2/6
ANTI-STALKING LAWS
association with a designated person.24°
Alternatively, a court may order an individual to be committed for
examination and observation by a mental health facility if it determines that the
individual is incompetent to stand trial.24 While ninety percent of all
stalkers suffer from some type of mental infirmity,242 it is unlikely that most
of their conditions are serious enough to warrant commitment for mental
examination and observation. Those stalkers who pose a danger to their
victims, but who are not a flight risk or incompetent to stand trial, fall through
the statutory cracks. Consequently, a suspect arrested for stalking is free to
retaliate against his victim once he is released on bail from his arrest.
Therefore, the legislature should consider the denial of bail, or a pretrial
detention, for violators of the antistalking law when there is clear and
convincing evidence243 that the violator poses a serious and immediate threat
to the victim if he is released.2'
Careful consideration must be given to any proposed system denying one
his liberty before a finding of guilt. The United States Supreme Court stated:
"[P]unishment imposed without a prior adjudication of guilt is per se
illegitimate . . . [.]"24 However, pretrial detention is not barred by the
United States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court held in United
States v. Salerno246 that the pretrial detention of an arrestee pending federal
criminal trial does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
when the detention meets a legitimate regulatory goal to prevent danger to the
community and the detention is not excessive in relation to the regulatory goal
Congress seeks to achieve.247
240. Id. § 17-15-10(a)-(c).
241. Id. § 44-23-410.
242. Puente, supra note 10, at 9A.
243. In United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), the United States Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, in part because it required a
showing articulated in writing that the arrestee posed a threat to an individual or the commu-
nity by clear and convincing evidence.
244. Passage of a provision of this sort would be difficult, for it would require an amend-
ment to the state constitution. An amendment requires approval by two-thirds of each house
of the General Assembly and a majority of those voting in a general election. See S.C.
CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (providing for amendments to the state constitution).
Electronic ankle bracelets might be an alternative to denying bail not requiring a state
constitutional amendment. For a discussion on the feasibility of requiring stalkers to wear
electronic ankle bracelets that sound an alarm at the police station when the stalker comes
within a specified distance from his victim, see Westen, supra note 3, at 122. But see, Fatal
Holdup Spurs Tracking Bracelet Debate, THE STATE, Dec. 10, 1993, at 7A (reporting the
failure of this device in a tracking program for juvenile pretrial detention).
245. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 271 (1984) (upholding the constitutionality of a New
York juvenile pretrial detention program).
246. 481 U.S. 739.
247. Id. at 747.
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The Court scrutinized the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 in Salerno
upon a challenge to its constitutionality. The Court determined that the Act
was regulatory in nature, not penal, because it provided several safeguards to
ensure an arrestee due process of law. First, the Act carefully limited the
circumstances under which detention could be sought to "the most serious of
crimes . . . [:] crimes of violence, offenses for which the sentence is life
imprisonment or death, serious drug offenses, or certain repeat offend-
ers."248 Second, "[t]he arrestee is entitled to a prompt detention hearing, .
. . and the maximum length of pretrial detention is limited by the stringent
time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act. "249 Third, the detainees are housed
in facilities separate from those housing persons awaiting or serving sentences
upon their convictions.21° Finally, the Ac requires a showing by clear and
convincing evidence that the arrestee posed a threat to the community, and that
showing must be articulated in writing in the court record.0'
One statute that meets the Salerno test is the Illinois law denying bail in
stalking and aggravated stalking offenses. 2?' The Illinois law permits pretrial
detention
when it is alleged that the defendant's admission to bail poses a real
and present threat to the physical safety of the alleged victim of the
offense, and denial of release on bail or personal recognizance is
necessary to prevent fulfillment of the threat upon which the charge
is based? 3
The stalker is given prior notice of a petition filed for his detainment when the
police have arrested and released him before its filing; he is not given prior
notice when he remains in custody at the time the state filed its petition.'
The hearing on the petition must be held immediately upon the offender's
appearance before the court, or no later than five days if a continuance on the
motion of the defendant is granted.2?5 After the hearing, the court may deny
bail only when clear and convincing evidence' 6 satisfies the guidelines set
out in the law.' 5
248. Id. at 747; see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1988).
249. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.
250. Id. at 748; see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)(2).
251. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750, 752.
252. 725 ILL. STAT. ANN. § 5/110-6.3 (West 1992).
253. Id. § 5/110-6.3(a).
254. Id. § 5/110-6.3(a)(1).
255. Id. § 5/110-6.3(a)(2).
256. Id. § 5/110-6.3(c)(2)(B).
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Opponents of the Illinois law criticize the -fact that the law does not
require the victim to attend the hearing, thereby denying the defendant his
constitutional right to confront and examine the witness against him."
Instead, the court has the discretion to compel the victim to attend the trial
upon the defense's request. 9 A court only will exercise its power when the
defense requests her appearance for a purpose other than to impeach her
credibility.' ° Additionally, "[i]n deciding whether to compel the appearance
of a complaining witness, the court shall be considerate of the emotional and
physical well-being of the witness."261
The Illinois legislature should be commended for recognizing stalking's
impact on the victim. 262 That state's noble attempt to alleviate further
suffering to the victim should be sustained because the United States Supreme
Court held that the confrontation clause does not grant the right to confront a
witness at a preliminary hearing. 263 However, "[a]ll jurisdictions grant the
defense a right to cross-examine those witnesses presented by the prosecution
at the preliminary hearing." 26 Therefore, South Carolina should model a
pretrial detention program after the Illinois law.
(1) the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant
has committed the offense of stalking or aggravated stalking; and
(2) the defendant poses a real and present threat to the physical
safety of the alleged victim of the offense; and
(3) the denial of release on bail or personal recognizance is neces-
sary to prevent fulfillment of the threat upon which the charge is based;
and
(4) the court finds that no condition or combination of conditions
set forth in subsection (b) of Section 110-10 of this Code, including
mental health treatment at a community mental health center, hospital, or
facility of the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabili-
ties, can reasonably assure the physical safety of the alleged victim of
the offense.
725 ILL. STAT. ANN. § 5/110-6.3(b)(1)-(4) (West 1992).
258. Sonya Live, supra note 25. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VI (Confrontation
Clause).
259. 725 ILL. STAT. ANN. § 5/110-6.3(c)(1)(A).
260. "Cross-examination of a complaining witness at the pretrial detention hearing for the
purpose of impeaching the witness' credibility is insufficient reason to compel the presence of
the witness." Id.
261. Id.
262. See generally Puente, supra note 10 (suggesting that stalking victims join a support
group).
263. Goldsby v. United States, 160 U.S. 70 (1895).
264. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 14.4(c), at 677
(2d ed. 1992); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a) (providing that a defendant may cross-
examine adverse witnesses at a preliminary examination).
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C. Compulsory Mental Health Evaluation
Many stalkers need psychiatric help, not mere incarceration upon their
arrest. As stated, more than ninety percent of stalkers suffer from mental
disorders.2" Imprisonment provides temporary relief to a stalking victim,
but is an artificial remedy and a quick-fix to the much deeper psychological
problems of most stalkers. Therefore, a compulsory mental health evaluation
should become an integral part of a stalker's sentence to determine if further
counseling is needed.
Georgia recognizes this predicament. Georgia law provides that a judge
may
[r]equire the defendant to undergo a mental health evaluation and, if
it is determined by the court from the results of such evaluation that
the defendant is in need of treatment or .counseling, require the
defendant to undergo mental health treatment or counseling by a
court approved mental health professional, mental health facility, or
facility of the Department of Human Resources. 21,
The statute provides further that the defendant must pay the cost of his
treatment unless he is indigent.267
South Carolina sentencing judges have wide discretion to determine the
appropriate punishment for convicted criminals.2 68 However, because most
South Carolina judges are probably not educated in psychology they cannot
determine whether a stalker's actions are part of a mental disorder. A
sentencing guideline that requires all defendants to undergo mental health
evaluations would help determine which defendants need counseling to curtail
their stalking behavior. Therefore, South Carolina should adopt the Georgia
sentencing guideline, but require the mental health evaluation as part of the
sentence. The guidelines also should provide that a judge can waive the
evaluation upon a showing of good cause. A waiver recognizes that not all
stalkers need counseling, and that this treatment may be unnecessarily costly
to a defendant.269
265. See Puente, supra note 10, at 9A.
266. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-35.3(2) (Michie Supp. 1993).
267. Id.
268. See Bethea v. State, 262 S.C. 255, 204 S.E.2d 12 (1974).
269. Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646. 9 (g) (West Supp. 1994) (providing compulsory counsel-
ing for individuals who receive probation under the state's antistalking law). The court is
given the discretion to exempt the counseling requirement upon a showing of good cause.
[Vol. 45:383
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D. Inclusion of Threats to Family Members
Another problem with the credible threat definition is that it excludes
threats made to the victim's family members. The threat must cause a victim
to fear only for her personal safety.27° However, a stalker may believe that
his victim would return his affection but for his victim's relationship with
another or parental interference. Consequently, a stalker may harm someone
seen as his competition.27' Therefore, South Carolina's legislature should
amend the antistalking law as follows to ensure protection to a victim's family
members: "A credible threat" means a threat made with the intent and the
apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause a reasonable person to
reasonably fear for his safety, or the safety of his family, and must actually
cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his
safety, or the safety of his family. 272
E. A New, More Effective Temporary Restraining Order
The antistalking law provides no relief for victims of harassment without
a credible threat of injury. Currently, stalking and harassment victims can
obtain a TRO under the state Rules of Civil Procedure;273 however, the
process by which a TRO is obtained indicates that the rule is not designed to
assist in stalking or harassment situations. Rather, the rule is designed to
enjoin citizens from nuisance-type actions. For example, the rule provides that
a TRO obtained ex parte expires in ten days unless the court grants a continu-
ance, presumably, for up to ten additional days.274 Subsequently the
applicant may petition the court for a temporary injunction. 5 However, a
judge will issue a temporary injunction on the premise that it will expire at the
close of a proceeding for permanent relief, such as, a permanent injunc-
tion. 6 There is no permanent relief for a victim in a harassment situation.
Therefore, it is unlikely that a court would issue a temporary injunction.
Consequently, an ex parte TRO is effective for twenty days at most.
Thanks to the passage of the antistalking law, Ann's family obtained a
temporary injunction which expires at the close of their stalker's trial.
However, victims of harassment falling short of stalking cannot avail
270. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070(A)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
271. One stalker obsessed with Playboy Playmate Stacey Arthur gunned down Arthur's
husband after she rejected him. Bradburn, supra note 134, at 284.
272. California amended its antistalking law to include threats to family members. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1994).
273. S.C. R. Civ. P. 65.
274. Id. 65(b) (allowing an extension "for a like period of time").
275. No provision in Rule 65 sets forth the duration of a temporary injunction.
276. DOBBS, supra note 138, § 1.3, at 10.
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themselves of this remedy. Indeed, it may be difficult for a harassment victim
to obtain an ex parte TRO because she must prove immediate and irreparable
injury will result without the immediate issuance of the order.277 This
standard may be difficult to meet without a credible threat of injury to tie
victim. Also, obtaining a non-ex parte TRO might be even more difficult
because often it is difficult to serve process on a stalker.
Not surprisingly, a review of South Carolina cases regarding permanent
injunctions reveals that no appellate court has decided whether permanent
injunctions can be issued to enjoin an individual from harassing his victim.
In fact, it is possible that no South Carolina court ever has heard a petition of
this nature. Thus, South Carolina must incorporate a different process
whereby all victims can obtain injunctive relief from harassment.
Minnesota employs a TRO process worth emulating. The Minnesota
harassment law addresses most of the inadequacies of a TRO, as discussed
above.273 In particular, it provides a TRO applicant with assistance in filing
for the order. In addition, it permits the police to arrest a harasser who
violates the order. However, it does not provide for emergency hours during
which a victim can obtain a TRO. South Carolina should model a new
restraining order provision after the Minnesota harassment law, but with the
addition of procedures for emergency after-hours relief.
A Minnesota court will issue an ex parte TRO to harassment victims upon
a finding of "reasonable grounds to believe that the [harasser-]respondent has
engaged in harassment."279 The court will issue a TRO upon a petition for
a restraining order, which can last up to two years2uo and is effective until
the hearing on the restraining order is held.28' The victim-petitioner must
accompany her petition with a sworn affidavit in which she alleges specific
facts to show that the accused is harassing her. She also must state the
specific facts and circumstances from which relief is sought.2"
The Minnesota statute provides for an ex parte hearing on the restraining
order only if the respondent cannot be served with notice of the hearing
283
and after the petitioner has mailed copies of the petition and TRO to the
277. Id.
278. See supra notes 134-46 and accompanying text.
279. MINN. STAT. § 609.748 (West 1994). The law defines "harassment" as including
"repeated, intrusive, or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that are intended to adversely affect
the safety, security, or privacy of another, regardless of the relationship between the actor and
the intended target." Id. § 609.748(1)(a).
280. Id. § 609.748(5)(a)(3).
281. Id. § 609.748(4)(c).
282. Id. § 609.748(3)(a).
283. "ITihe petitioner [must] filet] an affidavit with the court stating that an attempt at
personal service made by a sheriff was unsuccessful because the respondent is avoiding
service by concealment or otherwise." Id. § 609.748(3)(b)(1).
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respondent's residence, if known to her.2" This hearing must be held within
fourteen days of the TRO issuance, unless the court grants an extension.'
A court will grant the restraining order enjoining the respondent from further
harassment upon the same finding required for a TRO: the existence of
"reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in harass-
ment."286  Violation of a TRO or restraining order is a misdemeanor
punishable by imprisonment for up to ninety days, a fine of up to $700, or
both.
217
Finally, the Minnesota law permits police to arrest a harasser without a
warrant when the police have probable cause to believe the harasser has
violated the TRO.1 8  This provision does not violate the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against the government conducting unreasonable
searches and seizures." The United States Supreme Court has held that the
reasonableness requirement does not mean that a warrant must be obtained
before making all arrests.2"
The State should incorporate the new TRO system into the antistalking
law, rather than alter the TRO available under the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Issuing a TRO would give a harasser notice that his conduct is more than
frowned upon. It would warn him that continuing his conduct would be
punished and, perhaps, constitute the crime of stalking. Certainly the
legislature considered such a pairing when it included increased penalties for
those stalkers against whom there is a TRO outstanding.29'
F. Creation of Threat Management Teams
Finally, city police departments should look into creating "Threat
Management Teams" (TMT) like the one instituted in Los Angeles, California.
The Los Angeles Police Department's (LAPD) Chief of Police created the
TMT by special order in February 1992, in response to the increase in
284. Id. § 609.748(3)(b). If service can not be made directly on the respondent, the law
allows for service by publication. Id.
285. MINN. STAT. § 609.748(4)(c) (West 1994).
286. Id. § 609.748(5)(a)(3). The court must also find that the petitioner properly filed her
petition and properly served the respondent. Id. § 609.748(5)(a)(1)-(2).
287. Id. § 609.748(8)(2).
288. Id. § 609.748(6)(b).
289. The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976),
stated that the common law permitted warrantless arrests in two cases: 1) when a police
officer has reasonable grounds to believe that an individual has committed a felony; and 2)
when a misdemeanor is committed in the presence of a police officer. Id. at 418.
290. See id. at 411 (providing that police are not required to obtain a warrant before
arresting a person in a public place, even though there was enough time and opportunity to
obtain one).
291. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
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celebrity stalking in the 1980s. "[T]he primary mission of [the TMT] is to
manage cases - both criminal and noncriminal - wherein individuals have
demonstrated an abnormal fixation and generated an identifiable, long-term
pattern of unsolicited acts of visitation and/or telephonic or written correspon-
dence in an annoying or threatening manner towards a specific person."29
The TMT reviews all stalking-like cases brought to its attention to
determine whether it will handle the case. An interview with each alleged
victim assists in making this determination. The team distributes a pamphlet
outlining security recommendations at each interview, regardless of whether
it accepts the case.2 3 Upon acceptance of a case, the TMT's responsibilities
include: the continued investigation of the case; the filing of any necessary
crime reports; the assisting in the procurement of any TROs or stalking
warrants; the identifying and locating of alleged stalkers who have kept their
identity hidden; the interviewing and surveillance of alleged stalkers; and the
procurement of psychological assistance for stalkers, when necessary. 294
South Carolina law enforcement should initiate such measures in each city
police station. A TMT could be composed of one or two officers in each city
who are trained to recognize stalking behavior and its implications. Indeed,
the antistalking law is ineffective without the support of police officers who
are adequately trained to address this crime.
X. CONCLUSION
It is distressing that stalking has become so common that all fifty states
have been forced to recognize it as a crime and to take measures to address it.
It is more distressing, however, that some states may see the repeal of their
stalking law because of their haste in adopting legislation "so broad as to be
unconstitutional."29 Senator William Cohen, R-Maine, recognized this
problem and introduced a bill mandating that the National Institute of Justice
(NIJ) work with the United States Attorney General to evaluate existing and
proposed antistalking laws and develop model legislation for the states. The
292. Lane, supra note 5, at 27.
293. The security recommendations include residence security measures suggesting that
victims trim shrubbery and install porch lights at a height which would discourage removal.
Office security measures suggest removing the victim's name from any reserved parking
areas, and refusing to accept any package unless the victim personally ordered the item.
Personal security measures suggest utilizing a private mail box service to receive all personal
mail and destroying discarded mail. Finally, vehicle security measures include equipping the
gas tank with a locking gas cap and visually checking the front and rear passenger compart-
ments before entering the vehicle. Security Recommendations, Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment, Threat Management Unit.
294. Telephone interview with Detective Greg Boles, LAPD Threat Management United
Detective Headquarters Division of Los Angeles, California, Sept. 7, 1993.
295. Puente, supra note 10.
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bill passed as an amendment to the Commerce Justice Appropriations Bill2 96
in October 1992. The NIJ completed its report on stalking and in October
1993 sent copies to all state Attorneys General. The report includes model
antistalking legislation that "encourages legislators to make stalking a felony
offense; to establish penalties for stalking that reflect and are commensurate
with the seriousness of the crime; and to provide criminal justice officials with
the authority and legal tools to arrest, prosecute, and sentence stalkers."297
Like any other crime, the criminalization of stalking will not make it go
away. Society will not see a decrease in stalker-related violence until states
institute comprehensive antistalking laws that focus both on the plight of the
victim and that of the stalker. South Carolina has taken the first step toward
helping victims like Ann but has yet to fully stand up to stalkers. Until a more
comprehensive law is passed, Ann and others like her will continue to live
with the knowledge that their ordeal is far from over.
Christine Olle Sloan
296. Pub. L. No. 102-395, 106 Stat. 1842 (1992).
297. United States Dep't of Justice & Nat'l Inst. of Justice, Project to Develop a Model
Antistalking Code for States 43 (1993). This author supports the recommendations in the
report as they are similar to those made in this note. She will lobby for their passage in the
1995 South Carolina legislative session.
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